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Abstract: 
Existing economic models show how new technology can cause large changes in relative 
wages and inequality.  But there are also claims, based largely on verbal expositions, that new 
technology can harm workers on average or even all workers.  This paper shows – under 
plausible assumptions - that new technology is unlikely to cause wages for all workers to fall 
and will cause average wages to rise if the prices of investment goods fall relative to 
consumer goods (a condition supported by the data).  We outline how results may change 
with different assumptions. 
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Introduction 
There are widespread concerns among commentators from many different backgrounds 
(including science, philosophy, business as well as economics: see, for example, Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee, 2014, Ford, 2015, Frey and Osborne, 2017, Susskind and Susskind, 2015, 
Bostrom, 2014, White House, 2016, Peter Stone et al., 2016)) about the current and likely 
future impact of new technology (mostly robots and artificial intelligence) on the demand for 
labor.  There is also a growing empirical literature on the impact of new technology and 
robots on the labor market (Autor and Dorn, 2013, Goos et al., 2014, Graetz and Michaels, 
2015, Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).   
Fears about the impact of new technology on workers are not new, although the technology 
feared has varied over time (Bowen, 1966, Autor, 2015,).  Past fears proved unfounded, but it 
is argued (not for the first time) that ‘this time is different’, and that the impact of past 
technologies can be no guide to the impact of future technologies. But many of the current 
analyses of the likely impact of new technology on workers rely on verbal or partial 
equilibrium analysis without a formal model of the economy as a whole.  The risk is that the 
conclusions are not based on underlying consistency of reasoning.  This paper is about the 
conditions in which new technology can or cannot harm workers, and is motivated by the 
belief that the existing literature largely consists of a set of special models while this paper 
aims for results that are as general as possible. 
The existing economics literature provides examples of models in which new technology 
causes large changes in relative wages and increases in inequality (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor, 
2011).  And if capital is regarded as fixed then it is simple to write down a constant returns to 
scale production function in which wages for all workers fall.  If the production function is 
 , ,F L K   where   is new technology, and 0F
 

 so new technology raises output but 
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0F
L 
 
 
 then the marginal product of labour and the wage falls with new technology. 
But it has proved much harder to write down models with endogenous capital in which wages 
fall.  For example Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017a) identify what they call the ‘productivity 
effect’ that causes wages to rise with new technology in their model once capital is 
endogenous.  But their model has one type of labour and one good (which can be a capital or 
consumption good) and a very particular form of new technology, leaving open the question 
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of whether there are alternative models in which wages can fall.  The aim of this paper is to 
present simple but general models to address this issue.  
This paper considers models in which there are an arbitrary number of types of labor, and 
arbitrary number of goods that may be used for consumption or capital or both, and arbitrary 
forms of new technology, seeking necessary and sufficient conditions for when wages may 
rise or fall.   
In our benchmark model we assume that labor is the only fixed factor, that the interest rate is 
unaffected by new technology, that there are constant returns to scale and perfect competition, 
and that we are comparing economies with different levels of technology in steady-state (an 
approach also taken in Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). 
In the benchmark model our first result is that at least one type of worker must be made 
better-off by new technology.  A corollary is that models with only one type of labor must 
have the feature that real wages rise with new technology.  This leaves open the possibility 
that workers as a group lose.   
Our second main result is that new technology must cause the average wage of workers to 
rise if the price of capital goods falls relative to consumption goods, a condition that seems 
satisfied in the data.  This leaves open the possibility that there might be very large rises in 
inequality but we also show that if the supply of labor of different types is perfectly elastic, 
then all workers must gain. 
Taken together these results are more optimistic about the impact of new technology on 
workers than many current discussions.   But they are results in models and are based on 
assumptions that may not be satisfied – the paper concludes with a discussion of how 
alternative models might lead to different conclusions.   
 
Benchmark Model and Main Results 
We denote the supply of the many types of labour in the economy by a (row) vector L .  For 
the moment we assume the supply of each type of labor is fixed but we return to this below. 
We denote wages by a (column) vector w  and assume all workers supply labour inelastically 
and will work for any non-zero wage.   
 
We assume there are many types of consumption, intermediate and capital goods. Denote the 
price vector of consumer and/or intermediate goods as p  and the rental price of capital goods 
as Kp . 
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Assumption CRS: The production function has constant returns to scale in every sector. 
 
Denote the unit cost function for consumption/intermediate goods by the 
vector  , , ,Kc w p p   and for investment goods by  , , ,i Kc w p p   where    is the level of 
technology.  This set-up allows for the possibility that some goods may be impossible to 
produce (have an infinite cost) at some technologies  
 
Improvements in technology are captured by assuming that the cost function must be non-
increasing in   for all goods (both consumption and investment) at constant wages and prices: 
   , , , , , ,
0, 0
K i K
i
c w p p c w p p
c c 
 
 
 
   
 
  (1) 
with a strict inequality for at least one good.  For the analysis to be interesting we also need to 
assume that, for given wages, improvements in technology reduce the price of at least one 
good that is demanded by consumers.  This does not require technology to affect the cost 
function for these goods directly, it might be an indirect effect through an impact on the costs 
of producing intermediate or investment goods that are used in that sector.  This rules out the 
possibility that new technology only affects the production of a set of goods that have no link, 
direct or indirect, to consumption goods.  Such a set of goods will have zero production in 
equilibrium as they serve no purpose. 
 
We need to make some assumptions about how prices are determined.  
 
Assumption RK: There are financial assets paying an interest rate  r, unaffected by changes 
in technology.  
The constant interest rate assumption implies that the supply of capital is perfectly elastic in 
the long-run: this could be derived from an underlying model of consumer choice when, in a 
static steady-state, the interest rate would be the rate of time preference, but we do not go into 
the details here. We also assume that capital goods depreciate at a constant rate  . Then, a 
conventional no-arbitrage argument implies that the relationship between the cost of capital 
and the price of investment goods is  K ip r p  , where ip   is the price of investment 
goods. 
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About the nature of markets we assume: 
 
Assumption PC: Output and input markets are perfectly competitive.    
 
PC implies that prices equal unit costs so that we have: 
   , , ,ip c w p r p     (2) 
   , , ,i i ip c w p r p     (3) 
Finally, we make the following assumption, largely for tractability 
 
Assumption HOM: Consumers’ preferences are homothetic so there is a unique consumer 
price index, denoted by  e p .  
 
Results 
In what follows we simply compare steady-states with constant levels of technology, asking 
whether wages are higher or lower in economies with more advanced technology.  This 
approach allows us to be as general as possible about the way in which technology affects 
production opportunities.  But there is a cost – we do not model the transition from one 
steady-state to another, nor do we model an economy in which technology is changing over 
time.  Economic models of growth typically make quite restrictive assumptions about how 
new technology affects productive opportunities, often to have a model that is analytically 
tractable and displays balanced growth (Uzawa, 1961, Acemoglu, 2008, Grossman et al., 
2017). 
 
The first result of this paper is the following (proved in the Appendix). 
 
Result 1: Improvements in technology must raise the real wage of at least one type of worker. 
 
The intuition for this is that, conditional on prices and wages, costs are weakly decreasing in 
technology.  This means that, conditional on wages, all prices must be weakly decreasing in 
technology.  This means that no price increase can be larger than the largest wage increase. 
For this group of workers, real wages must therefore be rising.   
A corollary of Result 1 is that in models with only one type of labor, new technology of any 
form must raise real wages for all workers.   
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Result 1 says that at least one group of workers must gain from new technology but leaves 
open the possibility that almost all workers lose.  However the next result provides a 
sufficient condition for the average wage to rise. 
  
Result 2: Improvements in technology raise the average real wage of workers if the price 
index of investment goods does not increase relative to the price index of consumption goods. 
 
This result is the main result of the paper so the proof is in the main text. Given assumption 
HOM the expenditure function for workers can be written as   we p u   where  e p is the price 
index and wu is the (column) vector of utilities for each type of worker.  In equilibrium total 
expenditure must equal total income for each type of worker which gives us:  
  
ww e p u  (4) 
The total utility of workers will be wLu , which can be interpreted as (total) real wages.  
Using (4) and taking logs we have that: 
  log log log
wLu Lw e p 
 (5) 
Now consider a change d  in technology.  From (5) we have that:  
 
 
   
1
w w
p
w w
w
e p dpLdu Ldw Ldw X dp
Lu Lw e p Lw Lu e p
Ldw X dp
Lw
   
     (6) 
Where wX  is the vector of consumption demands by workers, and we have used Shephard’s 
Lemma to substitute out for ep.   
Given the assumption that existing capital all depreciates at a rate  , to maintain capital 
stocks of K  in a steady-state requires investment of I K .  Capital-owners have total 
income per period of   ir p K  but have to spend ip K on maintaining their capital 
holdings so have total consumption expenditure of irp K .  
Since the prices of consumption goods equal their unit costs, the change in prices from a 
change d  in technology can be written as:  
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 
k
w p k
i
w p k
dp c dw c dp c dp c d
c dw c dp r c dp c d



 
   
    
 (7) 
And the change in the price of investment goods can be written as:  
 
 
i i i i k i
w p k
i i i i i
w p k
dp c dw c dp c dp c d
c dw c dp r c dp c d



 
   
    
 (8) 
From Shephard’s Lemma, total demands for intermediate goods, dX   can be written as: 
 
d i i
p p p pX Xc Ic Xc Kc     (9) 
There is also an equivalent equation for the demand for capital goods:  
 
d i i
k k k kK Xc Ic Xc Kc     (10) 
And total demands for labor can be written as: 
 
d i i
w w w wL Xc Ic Xc Kc     (11) 
In equilibrium, we must have the complementary slackness condition   0dL L w  .  This 
implies that if wages for a particular type of labor is positive then demand for that type of 
labor must equal supply.  But if the wages for a particular type of labor are zero then it is 
possible that demand is less than supply and there is some unemployment of that type of 
labor. Here we assume that dL L  for all types of labor as this makes the algebra simpler. 
But we discuss the other case in the Appendix – it does not alter the result. 
Now pre-multiply (7) by X , the total vector of consumption goods (some of which are used 
as intermediate goods) and (8) by I  and sum them to have:  
     
i
i i i i i i
w w p p k k
Xdp Idp
Xc dw Ic dw Xc dp Ic dp r Xc dp I r c dp Xc Ic d   

         
 (12) 
Using (9)-(11) this can be written as: 
 d i i iX X dp Idp Ldw r Kdp Xc Ic d                (13) 
Now d w kX X X X     where wX  is consumption of workers and kX  is consumption of 
capitalists, and I K  in steady-state in which case we have:  
0w i k iLdw X dp rKdp X dp Xc Ic d                    (14) 
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The first term in square brackets is, from (6), the change in the total utility of workers.  The 
second term in square brackets is related to the change in the total utility of capitalists.  The 
sum of these terms must be positive saying that the gains from new technology must flow 
either to workers or capitalists.  But this does not say that workers must get some share of the 
gains.  But (14) can be written as: 
   
w w k i i
i
k i i
i
Ldu Ldw X dp X dp rKdp Xc Ic d
dp dpp X r p K Xc Ic d
p p
 
 


               
          
 
 (15) 
Where   denotes a Hadamard product and /dp p   is vector of proportional changes in prices.  
(15) can then be written as:  
   
i
k i
i
w k i
k i
i
k i
i
dp dpp X p K
p pLdu pX Xc Ic d
pX p K
dp dppX Xc Ic d
p p
 
 


 
 
        
  
          
 
 
 
 (16) 
Where the first line uses the fact that from the capitalists’ budget constraint k ipX rp K  and 
p  is the consumer price index and ip  the investment goods price index.  The term in the 
difference in inflation rates is positive if investment goods prices fall faster than consumer 
goods prices (e.g. because consumer goods involve more labour-intensive services), proving 
the result. 
 
The importance of the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods can be 
understood through a simple model.  In clarifying the role of the assumptions it is useful to 
reduce the number of goods and labor to one but to assume the relative price of investment 
goods is affected by technology,  ip   (what Greenwood et al, 1997, term investment-
specific technical change). Represent the gross output of the economy through the use of a 
production function: 
  , , ,Y F L X K    (17) 
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Where labor is, L ,  intermediate inputs, X , and capital, K . and the state of technology that 
we denote by θ.   Normalize the price of the consumption good to 1 and denote the wage paid 
to labor by w . With a constant interest rate the cost of capital will be   ip r  .  
With constant returns to scale the total payment to inputs exhausts total output.  So total 
payments to labor can be written as:  
      , , , iwL F L X K X p r K        (18) 
i.e. gross output net of the intermediate goods used and the payments to the owners of capital.  
Differentiating (18) with respect to new technology leads to:  
 
    
 
1
i
i
i
w F F X F K pL p r r K
X K
F pr K
  
    

 
                            
   
 
  (19) 
Where the second equality follows because the terms involving X and K cancel under the 
assumption that these inputs are paid their marginal product. The first term in the second line 
is positive as is the second term if the relative price of investment goods is falling.  Result 2 
simply shows the same is true with many goods and types of labor1. 
 
The intuition for Result 2 is that new technology allows more output to be produced than 
before.  This extra output might go to labor or the owners of capital.  But if the impact of the 
new technology is to reduce the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods, 
then the return to existing capital must fall, causing a rise in the overall return to labor.  And 
any additional capital must be paid its marginal product so its return cannot be at the expense 
of labor.  Result 2 does not imply that the labor share of national income rises (Karabarbounis 
and Neiman, 2013) because the stock of capital might increase enough to more than off-set 
the fall in relative investment goods prices. 
 
It is obviously important to consider whether the condition that investment good prices fall 
relative to consumption goods is likely to be satisfied in practice. Most data suggests that it is 
(Krusell et al., 2000, Jones, 2016, IMF, 2017). But one implication is that it is possible to 
                                                          
1 Casual inspection of (19) might lead one to think that if the relative price of investment goods rises enough, 
wages could fall even with one type of labor which would contradict Result 1.  But if there is no technical 
regress in producing capital goods there is an upper bound on the increase in the price of investment goods 
which is that 
ln lnip w
 
 
 
, in which case (19) implies real wages must rise. 
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come up with an example in which new technology raises the relative price of capital goods 
and the average wage of workers falls - this is done in the Appendix.  
 
Results 1 and 2 do not say anything about whether all or most workers benefit – it is possible 
that the majority of workers lose or that there will be no demand for some types of workers 
even if their wages fell to zero.  So Results 1 and 2 do not say that new technology will not 
have serious consequences for inequality in labor income.  But there are policies that could 
ensure all workers gain.  With the assumption that the number of different types of workers is 
fixed, one can simply tax the winners and distribute to the losers without affecting any 
production decisions.  Note that one can achieve this by taxing only labor – one does not need 
to tax ‘robots’ as has been suggested by, among others, Bill Gates  (though seen Guerreiro et 
al., 2017, for a different argument supportive of taxing robots).  This process of redistribution 
may be politically difficult - especially if the winners and losers are in different countries – 
and one should not be complacent about the ability of political processes to restrain rises in 
inequality. But it is important to understand that there is a simple policy to ensure that all gain.  
 
Choice of Occupation 
The models used so far have assumed that the supply of different types of workers is fixed.  
In the long-run that is not a plausible assumption - think of types of labor as occupations and 
that workers can choose their occupation at the start of their careers.  It is plausible that the 
numbers of workers choosing different careers depends on the wages on offer, the costs of 
training for different occupations, and how pleasant or unpleasant is the nature of the work.  
One prominent case is that the labor supply to different occupations is perfectly elastic, which 
means that relative wages are fixed - occupations which require longer periods in education 
or are more unpleasant have to be compensated by higher wages. 
The perfect elasticity model may seem extreme but is not a bad approximation to the data – 
over time there have been huge changes in the level of employment in different occupations 
but relatively modest changes in relative wages. 
 
Result 3: If labor of different types is in perfectly elastic supply, then workers of all types 
must gain from technological progress. 
 
The intuition for this result is that perfectly elastic labor supply between occupations means 
that wage differentials are fixed, so that all wages must go up or down together, reducing the 
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model effectively to one with only one type of labor.  And a corollary of Result 1 is that if 
there is only one type of labor, then new technology of any form must raise real wages for all 
workers.  The benchmark model does not model the costs of the acquisition of human capital 
but, with perfectly elastic supply of labor to occupations, utility must be equalized across 
them and if there is an ‘entry-level’ occupation without training costs then utility net of 
training costs must also rise as the wage in the entry-level occupation will be rising as wages 
rise. 
 
The Role of the Assumptions of the Benchmark Model 
As indicated in the introduction, these models are only as good as their assumptions.  Here 
we indicate how the results can change if the assumptions are violated.  It is easiest to 
consider relaxing assumptions in the context of the one type of labor, one good model with 
the price of investment relative to consumption goods fixed at 1. Results 1 and 2 then imply 
that workers must gain from new technology if the assumptions of constant returns to scale, a 
constant interest rate and perfect competition are satisfied.  Now consider how one might try 
to over-turn this result by varying these assumptions. 
Decreasing Returns to Scale 
A very simple example of a decreasing returns to scale production function where the wage 
can fall is  L X   for α<1. But decreasing returns is often thought implausible because 
one can always replicate existing activities so decreasing returns to scale is often thought to 
result from an ‘omitted’ fixed factor.  So this result could be interpreted to say that while new 
technology increases the returns to fixed factors as a whole, it is just that labor is not the only 
fixed factor. Although it is a common and plausible assumption that labor is currently the 
main fixed factor, it is possible that some other fixed factor comes to be important, e.g. if 
robots required some rare earth in their manufacture.  In that case it is possible that the 
benefits from new technology go to the owners of that scarce factor and not to labor.  But this 
is a different argument from most accounts of the impact of new technology. The models of 
Hanson (2001) and Susskind (2017) in which workers are harmed by new technology rely on 
assuming decreasing returns or that labor is not the only fixed factor. 
 
 
Imperfect Competition 
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If there is imperfect competition then prices will be a mark-up on marginal costs.  Mark-ups 
do not necessarily cause the results outlined above to fail.  For example, Result 1 will still 
apply if one inserts mark-ups (possibly different for different goods), as long as mark-ups are 
constant.  But it is conceivable that technical change causes mark-ups to rise for some goods 
in which case it is possible for wages to fall.  The simplest way to see this is to note that 
 ip 



 in (19) could be very large and positive if technology causes investment goods 
industries to become less competitive and the mark-up to rise.  Some concern about rising 
mark-ups has been expressed (Autor et al., 2017, De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017),  but, even 
if relevant, it is less about the direct impact of technology and more about the way technology 
affects market competition.  One could also get falling real wages if there was imperfect 
competition in the labor market and technology increased the market power of employers. 
Imperfect competition also allows for increasing returns to scale in production.  The 
Appendix presents a simple model where each individual firm has increasing returns to scale 
and some market power, but there is free entry of firms into industries (i.e. a model of 
monopolistic competition).  It shows this is isomorphic to the models already considered if 
the fixed and variable costs of firms use inputs in the same proportions.  So our main results 
would apply in this case but one could conceivably get different results if fixed and variable 
costs use different types of inputs. 
 
Rising Interest Rate 
The Appendix shows that if new technology causes the interest rate to rise then this causes a 
rise in the return to capital and possible falls in real wages.  In most standard economic 
models the interest rate is a function of the underlying growth rate (zero in our steady-state) 
and the rate of time preference.  There is no particular reason why new technology would 
affect the rate of time preference so the mechanism for why interest rates might rise are not 
clear to us but we outline it as a hypothetical possibility. 
New technology might increase the growth rate of the economy which would be expected to 
increase the interest rate.  This would tend to reduce the real wage but the higher growth rate 
may cause wages to rise at a faster rate ultimately leading to higher real wages.  But our 
model with its comparison of steady states is silent about what might happen in a dynamic 
economy.  But the current problem facing many advanced economies does not seem to be one 
of fast productivity growth and high real interest rates. 
Non-Steady States 
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Our comparison of steady states allows us to be relatively general about the way that new 
technology affects production, but does come at the cost that we do not analyse the transition 
from one steady-state to another, and do not analyse an economy in which technology 
changes over time. This leaves open the possibility that new technology causes real wages to 
fall along the growth path.  However, it is well-known that these analyses are hard – one has 
to impose more restrictions than we have done to have attractable model of economic growth.  
One way in which our comparison of steady-states may be limited is in its analysis of a 
singularity if it becomes possible to produce robots that are identical to (or better than) people. 
If this is the case then labor is no longer effectively a fixed factor. In a steady-state this is a 
situation in which wages would fall to zero and prices of all goods would also fall to zero if 
there is perfect competition.  This would be an economy of total abundance because there is 
no longer a natural limit to the level of production caused by the existence of labor as a fixed 
factor.  But one could not get to the point of total abundance instantaneously so a model of 
transition would be needed.  Aghion et al (2017) provide a useful discussion of this case 
emphasizing the restrictive conditions under which singularities might be relevant. 
Conclusion 
The possible impact of new technology on workers has attracted a lot of attention.  Although 
there are many specific models which seek to investigate this, the existing literature does not 
lay out conditions under which new technology can be expected to harm no workers, all 
workers or reduce the average wage.  This paper has tried to do this using very simple 
underlying models.  One underlying theme is that it is harder than one might think to write 
down economic models in which workers as a group are harmed by new technology: the 
reason is that if labor is the only fixed factor and the terms of trade shift in favour of workers 
as the relative price of investment goods decline, then workers as a whole are likely to gain 
from new technology.  And if the supply of labor to different occupations is perfectly elastic, 
then all will gain.  The threats to wages from new technology may come more from impacts 
on the competitiveness of markets. 
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Appendix: Proof of Results and Specific Examples 
 
Proof of Result 1 
Stack the prices of consumption and investment goods into a single vector  .  Combine the 
cost functions into a single vector as well – continue to denote this by c .  Write the stacked 
prices as: 
 , ,c w     (1) 
Taking logs and differentiating leads to:  
log log log logw w c 
   
       
   
  (2) 
Where   is a non-negative matrix whose ijth element, ij , is given by: 
j i
ij
i j
c
c
 



  (3) 
From Shephard’s Lemma we know that the derivative of the cost function with respect to a 
price is the per output demand for that input.  Hence ij is the share of the cost of input j in 
the production of good i.  Similarly, w  is a non-negative matrix whose ijth element, wij , is 
given by: 
jw i
ij
i j
w c
c w
 

  (4) 
w
ij is the share of the cost of type of labor j in the production of good i. The ith row of    
must sum to one minus the share of labor costs in the production of good i, and the ith row of 
w   must sum to the share of labor in the production of good i. Denote the vector of shares of 
labor costs by s . 
 
Denote the maximum goods price change as 
maxlog 



 and the maximum wage change as 
maxlog w



.  Then (2) implies that, for all goods, we must have:  
 
max max
max max
log log log log
log log log1
wd d d w c
d d d
d d w cs s
d d
 
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    

   

  (5) 
With equality only for goods which are produced only use goods and labor with the 
maximum price and wage changes.  (5) applies for all goods, including goods with prices 
increasing at the fastest rate.  For these goods we can re-arrange (5) to yield:  
max max maxlog log 1 log logd d w c d w
d d s d

   
  

  (6) 
Where s  is the labor share for that good.  This proves the result but is only valid if 0s  .  
What happens if the good with the highest price increase is produced using no labor?   If this 
good is produced using some goods with price increases below the maximum then it cannot 
be the good with the highest price index as (5) will be a strict inequality leading to a 
contradiction if 0s  .  If it is only produced using goods with the highest price increase, this 
is a contradiction if there is any technical change in that sector.  If there is not, there is a set 
of goods with no technical change produced with no labor and only each other as 
intermediate or capital goods.  Because these goods are produced without fixed factors, there 
is no limit to the supply of them so the price of them will always be zero, contradicting the 
fact that they have the highest inflation rate. 
 
Ultimately workers are only interested in the price of consumption goods and this result 
seems to leave open the possibility that prices only fall for investment goods.  But if these 
investment goods are used, directly or indirectly (meaning it might only be used to produce 
investment goods but those investment goods are ultimately used in the production of 
consumption goods through some chain), this must be transmitted to the price of some 
consumption good.  There will be no production, in equilibrium, of a set of investment goods 
only used to produce themselves in which case the result says that technological change in 
goods that are not produced will have no benefit. 
 
Result 2 when the wage of some types of workers are zero 
It is possible that the wages of some types of labor fall to zero and there is possibly some 
unemployment for those types.  This case can be allowed for in the following way.  Remove 
these types of workers from the cost functions as the zero wage allows us to do this.  The 
result above then goes through for the set of workers with non-zero wages.  But the average 
wage result applies to all workers if we include the unemployed as having zero earnings.  The 
set of types of workers with zero wages may change with the technology but the formulae 
above remain valid even for this case. 
If all types of workers have zero wages then we are in a situation where all prices (as well as 
wages) will be zero, i.e. this is a situation of total abundance.  Our static analysis is not well-
suited to this case – it is discussed at the end of the paper. 
  
An example where the average wage of workers falls 
The example outlined here shows how the real wage of workers can fall if new technology 
causes the price of investment goods to rise relative to consumption goods i.e. the condition 
of Result 2 is not satisfied.  Such an example must have at least two types of goods (to allow 
relative prices to change) and two types of labor (otherwise Result 1 would imply that real 
wages would rise). 
Assume that there are two sectors, a consumption good sector and an investment good sector.  
The consumption good is assumed to be produced by one type of labor – call it c-labor – and 
capital goods, according to the production function: 
 , ,cc c c
c
KX L f L f k
L
    
    (7) 
The investment good is assumed to be produced by a different type of labor – call it i-labor – 
and capital goods according to the production function:  
 , ,ii i i
i
KI L g L g k
L
    
    (8) 
Assume the price of consumption good is numeraire – set it equal to 1. 
The wage of c-labour will be given by:  
c c kw f k f    (9) 
And the demand for capital in consumption good sector will be given by:  
  i kr p f    (10) 
The wage of i-labour will be given by:  
 i i i kw p g k g    (11) 
And the demand for capital in the i-sector will be given by:  
  i i kr p p g    (12) 
Note that (12) implies that the capital-labour ratio in the i-sector solves the equation:  
   ,k ig k r     (13) 
Which, conveniently, is independent of prices.  Given the inelastic supply of i-labour this also 
fixes the amount of i-capital.  Now the total supply of c-capital must satisfy the equation 
 c i i iK Lk L g     (14) 
Which can be re-arranged to give:  
i
c i
g kK L 

   (15) 
Which implies that the amount of c-capital can also be solved for independent of prices.  This 
then implies that the total capital stock is given by:  
i
gK L


  (16) 
Note that the production function for the consumer good plays no role in determining the 
total level of capital or its allocation across sectors. 
Total income to workers must be the difference between the production of consumption 
goods and the consumption of capitalists which is the part of their income not used to cover 
depreciation i.e. irp K  of capitalists.  This implies:  
i
c c i i c
c k c k i
Lw L w L w L f rp K
r r gL f f K L f f L
r r  
   
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 
  (17) 
Now suppose that the nature of the new technology is that it does not affect production of the 
investment good (this is an example so this is not meant to be plausible).  In this case g  is 
fixed and the capital-labor ratios in the two sectors are unaffected by the new technology.  
Differentiating (17) we have that:  
   c k i
d Lw r gL f f L
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 

  (18) 
The first term is positive but the second term can outweigh it if new technology heavily raises 
the marginal product of capital in the consumption goods sector. 
Note the link to the condition in Result 1.  (10) implies that the relative price of investment 
goods rises (resp. falls) if ( )0kf     .  If 0kf    the relative price of investment goods falls 
and (18) says that average wages must rise, consistent with Result 1.  But if 0kf   then the 
relative price of investment goods rises and and (18) says that average wages can fall. 
Proof of Result 3 
If there are many types of labor but they are in perfectly elastic supply then relative wages are 
constant.  The cost functions can be written as a function of the wage of one type of labor 
chosen as numeraire and the relative wages which are exogenous.  The model is then reduced 
to one in which there is only one wage and as result 1 implies the real wage must rise for one 
type of worker, they must rise for all types of labor. 
 
Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition 
Many current models of the economy assume that individual firms have increasing returns to 
scale.  This section considers what happens if that is the case.  Continue to use c  to denote 
marginal costs but now assume that firms have to pay a fixed cost  , ,fc w    to enter an 
industry – for simplicity here we use the stacked price approach of Result 1 rather than 
distinguish between consumption and investment goods.   
Increasing returns at the individual firm level is not compatible with perfect competition so 
we assume that price is a mark-up,  , possibly varying across sectors, on marginal costs i.e. 
we have: 
 1 c     (19) 
We treat   as exogenously given though it is usually derived from other parameters in the 
model – for our purpose this is not important. 
Free entry into an industry implies that total revenue of the industry must equal total costs 
which can be written as:   
  fc X Nc     (20) 
Where X  is gross output and N  is the number of firms.  Using (19) this can be written as:  
f
cN X
c

  (21) 
Now consider input demands.  Total demand from this sector for input j can be written as:   
f
j j
c cX N
p p
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    (22) 
Using (21), (22) can be written as: 
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If marginal costs and fixed costs using inputs in the same proportions this implies that 
log logf
j j
c c
p p
 
 
 the total factor demands can be written as:  
 1
j
cX
p
 
   (24) 
Which is completely isomorphic to our standard model using  1 c   as the cost function. 
One can derive a similar expression for the demand for a type of labor replacing the price 
with the wage.   
This leaves open the possibility that technology might harm workers if it affects fixed costs in 
a different way to marginal costs.  And it does assume that all firms within an industry are 
identical – many models assume heterogeneity which gives rents to the more productive 
firms.  It is possible that new technology might disproportionately advantage these firms.  
The analysis of these models is left for later research. 
 
